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SUSTAINABILITY WITHOUT POLITICS: HOW THE NERO ACT CAN
ENERGIZE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Congressman Lee Terry*
Introduction
Oversight and Government Reform Committee Hearing Concerning the
Leadership of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2157 Rayburn House Office
Building December 14t, 2011
[S]o, basically, one of the Commissioners just lied under oath is
what you're saying," Rep. Darrel Issa (R-CA) queried staring
down at Chairman Jaczko from his position at the head of the
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Panel.1 The
tension in the room is palpable as Jaczko pauses to collect his
thoughts before giving a vague diplomatic response. The
exchange between Issa and Jaczko goes back and forth like this for
several minutes, Issa aggressively directing questions at Jaczko,
Jaczko attempting to divert the questions with bland, non-
controversial responses. The purpose of the hearing this day is to
explore allegations of managerial misconduct levied at Chairman
Jaczko from Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and
Commissioners. Specifically, he has been accused of using
bullying and intimidation tactics to manage the agency, as well as,
manipulating the flow of information to his fellow Commissioners.
Seemingly unconcerned, Chairman Jaczko sits calmly in the midst
of the other Commissioners, all of whom have accused him of
impeding the functions of the NRC, and all of whom are testifying
against him this day.
Since its inception in 1974, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has
been viewed as a world-class regulatory agency. In recent years, this archetype of
good government has faltered. Under the leadership of Chairman Jackzo, we have
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1. See The Leadership of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Hearing Before the H. Oversight and




seen how a single individual, determined to expand the bounds of his authority, can
undermine the Commission's effectiveness. 2 Organizational weaknesses have been
exposed to the Commission and in order for the NRC to function effectively, these
weaknesses must be addressed. With the passage of my bill, The Nuclear
Emergency Re-Establishment of Obligation (NERO) Act, I hope to strengthen the
current legislation and in doing so, return the NRC to its former prominence.
In Part I of this paper I will provide you with background information about
how the agency operates, its traditional practices, and how the Commission has
recently deviated from its established norms under the leadership of Gregory
Jaczko. Part II gives a brief summary of the current legislation that dictates how the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission functions, and Part III is a description of my
proposed legislation, the NERO Act, which would clarify the role and obligations
of the Chairman.
I. Background
A. How the Agency Functions
In order to understand the need for NERO it is necessary to explain how the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission functions. When the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974 was passed, it created an independent agency who's duty it is to regulate
the civilian use of radioactive materials.3 The agency is headed by five
commissioners, who are nominated by the President, and confirmed by the Senate
for five-year terms. To provide a regular rotation of membership their terms are
staggered so that one Commissioner's term expires on June 30th every year. So as to
avoid partisanship, no more than three Commissioners may be from the same
political party.4 Including Chairman Jaczko, President Obama has appointed three
of the five present NRC Commissioners. The Commission is currently operating
with a 3-2 democratic majority.
From the five Commissioners, the President selects one to be the Chairman and
official spokesperson of the Commission. The Chairman's unique responsibilities
include serving as the agency's principal executive officer and exercising control
over the Commission's executive and administrative functions.5  All the
Commissioners, including the Chairman, have equal responsibility and authority
over the decisions and actions of the Commission. In order to best do their jobs,
each Commissioner is entitled full access to all information relating to the
performance of his or her duties, and one vote. No action is taken unless it is
2. See generally The Leadership of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Hearing Before the H
Subcomm. on Env't and the Econ., 112th Cong. (2012).
3. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, History, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nre/history.html#aec-to-
nrc (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
4. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Organization & Functions, http://www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/organization.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
5. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Policymaking http://www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/policymaking.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
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approved by a majority vote of the members present.6
When making decisions, the primary tool used is a written paper referred to as
a "SECY Paper." SECY Papers primarily stipulate policy, security, rulemaking, and
adjudicatory matters, as well as, general information.7 Commissioners also utilize
COMs, which are written memorandum exchanged between the five members.
COMs can present new issues for Commission consideration, or comment on an
action already pending review. Occasionally, a staff memorandum may contain a
recommendation to obtain direction from the Commission. When that occurs, the
memorandum is circulated in the COM system as a COMSECY.8 The Secretary
records the results of the Commission action on each SECY paper and action
memorandum (COM or COMSECY) in a Staff Requirements Memorandum
(SRM). The Secretary then issues a Commission Voting Record (CVR), which
includes a record of the votes and the individual views of each Commissioner.
Following Commission meetings, SRMs are issued that detail all discussion and/or
requests that were made throughout the duration of the meeting.9
The Commission operates under the statutory guidance known as the
Reorganization Plan. 10  This is supplemented by the Internal Commission
Procedures, which reiterates the Reorganization Plan Provisions concerning the role
of the Commission as a whole and the Chairman's individual roles.II
For years the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was held to be an archetype of
how good government functions. Despite their political differences, the
Commissioners were able to work together, functioning as a scientific body, as free
from political maneuvering as is possible in a governmental agency. This
cohesiveness arguably made the NRC the strongest regulatory agency in the
country and it is largely because of this strength that we, as a country, have been
able to avoid a large-scale nuclear incident.
Recently, the agency has moved away from its traditional practices. In 2005, at
the urging of Sen. Harry Reid (D-NV), Gregory Jaczko was appointed to the NRC.
Prior to his tenure as an NRC Commissioner, Jaczko served as Reid's
Appropriations Director and science policy. adviser Jaczko had also previously
been employed as a legislative assistant to Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA), an outspoken
opponent of nuclear energy.12 In 2009, despite the NRC generally pulling from the
rank of long-time commissioners, President Barack Obama appointed Jaczko as
Chairman of the NRC.
6. See id.
7. See id
8. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Commission Action Memoranda (COMs and COMESCYs),
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rn/doc-collections/commission/comm-secy/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
9. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Policymaking, http://www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/policymaking.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
10. See Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Governing Legislation, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/goveming-
laws.htmnl (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
11. See Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Internal Commission Procedures, http://www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/policy-making/internal.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).




Three years into his five-year term Jaczko has chosen to step down as
Chairman.' 3 His resignation came after extensive allegations of misconduct from
lawmakers and colleagues.14 Specifically, Chairman Jaczko was accused of
unilaterally and improperly closing out the NRC's review of the Department of
Energy's Yucca Mountain repository license application while the government was
operating under a continuing resolution (CR) in fiscal year 2011. He was also
accused of purposefully preventing the Commission from completing its ruling on
the Atomic Safety Licensing Board's decision to deny the Department of Energy's
motion to withdrawal its Yucca Mountain repository license application from the
NRC.' 6 The Inspector General's report also raised concerns about the Chairman's
management style towards staff and Commissioners,17 and whether the Chairman
withheld information from the other Commissioners that kept them from effectively
fulfilling their statutory responsibility. In June 2011, after conducting an
investigation into the alleged misconduct of Jaczko, the NRC Inspector General
(IG) published a report with his findings. Shortly after its publication, a second
internal probe was initiated after new accusations were made against Chairman
Jaczko. That report was released in June 2012.
B. Findings of the Reports
The first Inspector General's Report dealt predominantly with the closure of the
Yucca Mountain Project. Yucca Mountain, located 100 miles northwest of Las
Vegas, was the proposed site for a deep geological repository storage facility for
spent nuclear reactor fuel and other high level radioactive waste. 19 Currently, the
policy for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste is
defined by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,20 as amended (NWPA) and the
Energy Policy Act of 1992.21 These Acts dictate that spent nuclear fuel and high-
level radioactive waste must be disposed of underground, in a deep geological
repository. The NWPA specifically names Yucca Mountain as the sole candidate
for such a facility. NWPA guidelines state, the NRC "shall consider an application
13. Id.
14. See Mary Bruce, Nuclear Safety Chief Resigns Amid Criticism, May 21, 2012,
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/05/nuclear-safety-chief-resigns-amid-criticisms/ (last visited Oct.
17, 2012).
15. See Hubert Bell, NRC, Office of the Inspector General, OIG-11-05, Investigation into NRC
Chairman's Unilateral Decision to Terminate NRC's Review of DOE Yucca Mountain Repository License
Application (2011) at 7.
16. See id. at 29 ("Under the Commission's statutes and standing procedures, policy determinations are
made by a majority vote of the Commission, not by the unilateral action of the Chairman.").
17. See id. at 35.
18. See id. at 37.
19. See Jay Schecker, Yucca Mountain: The Million-Year Promise, Los Alamos Science and
Technology, Dec. 2008, at 15, available at http://lanl.gov/science/1663/issues/december2008.pdf (last visited
Oct. 17, 2012).
20. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425 (1982).
21. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486 (1992).
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for a construction authorization for all or part of a repository" 22 and shall issue a
final decision approving or disapproving the issuance of a construction
23authorization not later than three years after the application is submitted. License
applications are submitted by the Department of Energy (DOE), the department
tasked with constructing and operating the repository.24
The licensing review for the Yucca Mountain Project formally commenced on
October 22nd, 2008. Following the end of its technical review, the NRC intended to
publish a safety evaluation report (SER) that would contain its conclusions as to
whether the repository would meet NRC public safety and health regulations. The
SER was to be issued in 5 volumes; it was estimated that the first would be done in
August 2010, the third was to be completed in November 2012, the fourth in
January 2011, and the second and fifth volumes in March 2011.25 However, in
February 2010 President Obama's Administration announced that the Yucca
Mountain repository was "not a workable option" and immediately sought to halt
the licensing procedures.26 For Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, the Department of Energy's
budget allocated no funding for Yucca Mountain, further communicating the
current Administration's intent to discontinue the project.27
The NRC recognized the impending termination of the Yucca Mountain
repository in its FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification, stating that, due to
lack of Administrative support, the DOE could submit a motion to withdrawal or
suspend its Yucca Mountain license application in FY 2011.28 Upon approval of
withdrawal or suspension, the NRC would commence with the orderly closure of
the technical review and adjudicatory activities and would document the current
findings to date. On March 2, 2010 the Department of Energy submitted to the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) Panel a motion to withdraw the Yucca
Mountain licensing application. On June 29th, 2010, the ASLB delivered their
judgment denying the DOE's request. Their denial was based on the finding that the
DOE lacked the authority to apply for such a withdrawal.29 The ASLB reached this
conclusion after studying the NWPA and determining that Congress directed the
DOE to file the licensing request and the NRC to consider the application before
issuing a final merit-based judgment.30 Shortly after the license withdrawal was
denied, it was determined that the Commission would review the ASLB's decision.
In accordance with NRC processes, the Office of Commission Appellate
Adjudication submitted adjudicatory paper SECY-10-0102, (U.S. Department of
Energy High-Level Waste Repository, Review of LBP-10- 11, Docket No. 63-001-
22. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, § 114(2)(B)(4)(B)(d) (1982).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Hubert Bell, NRC, Office of the Inspector General, OIG-11-05, Investigation into NRC
Chairman's Unilateral Decision to Terminate NRC's Review of DOE Yucca Mountain Repository License








HLW,) to the Commission for its review and vote. Commissioners began casting
votes on August 25th, 2010, and though a majority of Commissioners had voted by
September 15th, 2010, Chairman Jaczko did not move to cast his final vote.
31
It wasn't until two months later on October 29, 2010, that Chairman Jaczko
voted on SECY-10-0102, completing the Commission's notational process on
Yucca Mountain; however as of June 2011, when the first IG report was issued, the
Commission had yet to hold a vote of affirmation and the draft order continued to
sit before the Commission for consideration. 32
With regards to voting procedures, the Inspector General noted, that while it is
the responsibility of the NRC to issue a final decision concerning the Yucca
Mountain license application, they have been prevented from doing so because of
various reasons. These reasons include: the Administration's decision to terminate
the project, the lack of funding for the High-Level Waste Program, and the
Chairman's direction to halt work on the SER. 33 Furthermore, internal procedures
concerning adjudicatory voting practices are not consistently enforced and lack
specificity. This allows matters to sit in abeyance before the Commission
indefinitely.34 While Jaczko cannot be faulted for the shortcomings of NRC internal
procedures, he can be criticized for taking advantage of them. After nearly 50 years
of efficient bipartisan operation, politics have come to the forefront of what has
predominately operated as a scientific agency, and in the process have exposed
weaknesses in the NRC's system.
The Inspector General next considered whether Jaczko had exceeded the
authority granted to him as Chairman when he used the FY 2011 budget to close
out review of Yucca Mountain. In September of 2010 Congress issued the first
series of Continuing Resolutions (CRs). A CR is a law that provides temporary
funding for those parts of the federal government for which annual appropriations
laws have not yet been enacted. In this initial issuance, Congress directed federal
agencies to spend money at FY 2010 levels, as needed, to carry on projects and
activities that were initiated in FY 2010.
On October 4h, the NRC Chief Financial Officer and the Executive Director of
Operations issued guidance via a memorandum to the NRC staff, directing them to
commit, obligate and expend funds for ongoing activities at FY 2010 levels, with
the exception of the High-Level Waste Program.3 5 The memorandum stated that
during the CR period, new work that was not authorized and funded in 2010 should
not be started in 2011. With regards to Yucca Mountain, the memorandum
instructed staff to continue its activities on the license application in accordance
with the Commission's decisions on the FY 2011 budget using available Nuclear
Waste Fund resources during the CR period.36 Shortly after the issuance of this
memorandum, Chairman Jaczko directed NRC staff working on the Yucca
31. See id. at 7.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 45.
34. See id.




Mountain license application review to stop working on Volume III of the SER,
which was slated for completion near the end of fiscal year 2010. 37
The Inspector General determined that it was within the purview of Chairman
Jaczko to use FY 2011 budget guidance as a vehicle to initiate the close out of the
Yucca Mountain project.38 However, though he had the authority to direct staff to
follow FY 2011 budget, he was not forthcoming with the other Commissioners
about his intent to halt work on SER Volume III as part of shutting down process of
Yucca Mountain. 39
The Chairman, recognizing that this action would be construed by the other
Commissioners as being controversial, tactically supplied three of the four
Commissioners with varying amounts of information about his intent to proceed to
closure and not complete SER Volume III.40 Two of the Commissioners,
Commissioner Magwood and Commissioner Apostolakis did not understand the
significance of the CR budget guidance memorandum. Commissioner Ostendorff
understood the implications of the memorandum and communicated his disapproval
to Chairman Jaczko, and Commissioner Svinicki was given no information about
the CR budget guidance memorandum.41 Despite this, Chairman Jaczko assured the
Executive Director of Operations and the Chief Financial Officer that all
Commissioners were in agreement concerning the CR budget guidance
memorandum and they could proceed with its issuance.42 In reality, the majority of
Commissioners opposed the outcome of the memorandum, which was the
Chairman's instruction to stop work on SER Volume III. In addition, the other
Commissioners felt the criteria that needed to be met before the license application
review process could be shut down had yet to be completed. 43
Following the circulation of the CR budget guidance memorandum, NRC
Commissioner William Ostendorff attempted to force a vote that would compel
commission staff to continue working on its assessment of the Yucca proposal.
Chairman Jaczko immediately informed Commissioners Magwood and Apostokalis
that he fully expected their support. 44 Despite feeling like the Chairman had not
been forthcoming with his intentions to use the CR budget guidance memorandum
to shut down all Yucca Mountain operations, including the completion of SER
Volume III, both Commissioners elected to recuse themselves from the vote. As a
result, there was no majority, and the Commission was incapable of moving the
matter from budget space, which is within the authority of the Chairman, to policy
space, which is within the authority of the Commission. 45
Throughout the course of the investigation, the IG was presented with extensive
testimony concerning the Chairman's management style. A former Chairman
37. See id.
38. See id at 44.
39. See id.
40. See id.







remarked that Jaczko, "often yelled at people and [that] his tactics had a negative
effect on people." He described the behavior as "ruling by intimidation." 46 Other
Commissioner staff members gave examples of unprofessional behavior and stated
that Jaczko created an intimidating work environment. Commissioner Svinicki and
Commissioner Magwood relayed specific instances where the Chairman used travel
funds as leverage in order to push his agenda.47 The IG also concluded that the
Chairman controlled information provided to the other Commissioners based on his
interpretation of his statutory authority as Chairman.48 Because he acted as
gatekeeper to determine what was a policy matter versus an administrative matter,
and managed and controlled information available to the other Commissioners, they
could never be certain that they were fully informed about policy matters that
should be brought to their attention.49
The initial IG report determined that Chairman Jaczko had broken no laws or
Commission rules, and his actions had been within the authority he was granted as
Chairman, a fact that he was quick to reiterate in a public statement.50 What he
failed to address was the disapproval from lawmakers on both sides of the political
spectrum censuring his handling of Yucca Mountain and the Inspector General's
determination that while Jaczko's behavior was not illegal, it was "wrong."51 What
these various criticisms seem to suggest, is that Jaczko had not broken any
Commission rules because before his tenure as Chairman, rules of this nature were
not necessary. Previous Chairmen had never used the shortcomings that exist in the
internal procedures to manipulate the system and push their own political agendas.
In August 2011, four Republican Senators requested that a second inquiry take
place, in order to investigate Jaczko for what they claimed was a continued pattern
of withholding information from colleagues and acting unilaterally on the
Commission's behalf.52 Specifically, they cited Jaczko's declaration in March that
Japan's nuclear crisis constituted an emergency in the United States.53  After
considering the new allegations, the Inspector General's Office determined that
there was enough evidence to warrant a second investigation. Two months later, all
four of the NRC Commissioners - Commissioners Magwood, Apostolakis,
Ostendorff, and Svinicki - wrote a letter to former White House Chief of Staff Bill
Daley voicing their concerns that Chairman Jaczko's actions were causing "serious
damage" to the Agency's ability to protect health and safety. The letter stated that
Jaczko has "intimidated and bullied" senior staff, ordered staff to withhold
46. See 158 CONG. REC. S2457-2462 (daily ed. April 18, 2012) (Statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell).
47. See Hubert Bell, supra note 25 at 43.
48. See id. at 40.
49. See id. at 41.
50. See Stephen Power, Report Slams U.S. Nuclear Regulator, WALL ST. JOURNAL, June 10, 2011, at
Al.
51. See Matthew Daly, Gregory Jaczko, NRC Chairman, Targeted By GOP Senators Over Japan Crisis
Comments, Huffington Post, August 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/25/gregory-jaczko-
nrc-gopn 936914.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
52. See Matthew Daly, Republicans Seek New Probe ofNRC Chairman Jaczko, Associated Press, Aug.





information meant for NRC members, and tried to "intimidate" an independent
NRC committee from reviewing aspects of the NRC's analysis of the accident at
Japan's Fukushima Daiichi plant. The Commissioners explained that Jaczko
"ignored the will" of the majority of the Commission and treated his fellow
Commissioners with such "intemperance and disrespect" that the Commission no
longer functions as effectively as it should. As they wrote, "[w]e believe that his
actions and behavior are causing serious damage to this institution and are creating
a chilled work environment at the NRC. We are concerned that this will adversely
affect the NRC's central mission to protect the health, safety and security of the
American people." 54 Though this letter had no bearing on the investigation being
conducted by the Inspector General, it further reiterated the deep-seated dissonance
that existed between Jaczko and his fellow Commissioners.
Jaczko formally announced his resignation in May 2012, a month before the
second IG report was set to be released. The investigation cleared Jaczko of any
wrongdoing concerning the Fukushima incident, but confirmed that Jaczko's
management style was impeding the collegial function of the Commission.5 5 The
Inspector General's Office "identified more than 15 examples of interactions
between the Chairman and NRC senior executives and Commissioners where the
chairman's behavior was not supportive of an open and collaborative work
environment." In addition, the Inspector General found the Chairman's December
2011 testimony before the House and Senate Committees was inconsistent in five
areas, with testimony provided to the Inspector General by NRC senior officials
during the investigation.56 Due to his decision to step down, it's unlikely that
Jaczko will face perjury charges.
The resignation of Chairman Jaczko does not lessen the need for supplementary
regulations. The NRC has spent years functioning as a scientific body, which has
allowed it to remain insulated from the politics that influence most government
agencies, but recent events illustrate the need to clarify the internal procedures that
guide the NRC, and the role of those who sit on the Commission. In order to ensure
that the NRC is never again manipulated to serve the agenda of one man, we must
analyze current legislation, determine where it is lacking, and strengthen it.
II. Current Legislation
Since the inception of nuclear energy we, as a country, have tried to create an
agency of experts to address the technical complexities of developing nuclear
material to be a sustainable energy force. Throughout the years many acts have
been passed in order to create a highly functioning, efficient agency. The first of
these was the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This Act is the fundamental U.S. law on
54. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, NRC IG Report
Serves as Vindication for Four "Courageous" NRC Commissioners (June 26, 2012) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Press Release].
55. See Matthew L. Wald, Inquiry on Nuclear ChiefFinds No Rules Were Broken, N.Y. TIMES GREEN
BLOG, June 27, 2012, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/inquiry-on-nuclear-chief-finds-no-rules-
were-broken (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
56. See Press Release, supra note 54.
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both the civilian and the military uses of nuclear materials. On the civilian side, it
provides for both the development and the regulation of the uses of nuclear
materials and facilities in the United States. It declares the policy that "the
development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote
world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and
strengthen free competition in private enterprise." 57 The Act requires that civilian
uses of nuclear materials and facilities be licensed, and it empowers the NRC to
establish by rule or order, and to enforce such standards to govern these uses, as
"the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the common defense
and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property."58
Commission action under the Act must conform to the Act's procedural
requirements, which provide an opportunity for hearings and federal judicial review
in many instances. 59
Under section 274 of the Act, the NRC may enter into an agreement with a
State for discontinuance of the NRC's regulatory authority over some materials
licensees within the State.60 The State must first show that its regulatory program is
compatible with the NRC's and adequate to protect public health and safety. The
NRC retains authority over, among other things, nuclear power plants within the
State and exports from the State. A major amendment to the Act established
compensation for, and limits on, licensee liability for injury to off-site persons or
damage to property caused by nuclear accidents.61
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which established the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), followed this Act. Prior to the passing of the
Energy Reorganization Act, the Atomic Energy Commission had the sole
responsibility for the development and production of nuclear weapons in addition to
the development and the safety regulation of acceptable civilian uses of nuclear
material. With the passing of the 1974 Act, these functions were divided, assigning
to one agency, now known as the Department of Energy, the responsibility for the
development and production of nuclear weapons, the promotion of nuclear power,
and other energy-related work. The newly established Nuclear Regulatory
Commission was assigned regulatory duties, not including the supervision of
defense nuclear facilities.62
Reorganization Plan No. I of 1980 strengthened the executive and
administrative roles of the NRC Chairman, particularly in emergencies, transferring
to the Chairman "all the functions vested in the Commission pertaining to an
emergency concerning a particular facility or materials .. . regulated by the
Commission."63 This amendment was passed, largely due to the Three Mile Island
incident in 1979 during which there was a disastrous attempt by the Lieutenant
57. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 1(b) (1953).
58. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 161(b) (1953).
59. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Governing Legislation, http://www.nrc.gov/about-







Governor of Pennsylvania to interfere in the control room. Now, with the passage
of Reorganization Plan No. 1, not even the President of the United States has
jurisdiction in the control room during an emergency.
Detailed in the 1980 House and Senate committee reports was a means for
which controversial issues were to be resolved within the NRC. These established
practices have worked extremely well until recently. As with all administrative
agencies, throughout the agency's history, its Chairman has attempted to gain
administrative power. In the past, the other Commissioners have always served as
the Chairman's voice of reason, pulling him or her back whenever he or she
overstepped their bounds. Today, the NRC is functioning differently than it was
meant to. The discord between the previous Chairman and his staff led to an
uncertainty of the Chairman's duties. This confusion has led to changes that have
come without the benefit of new legislation, and as we have garnered from recent
events, these changes are far from beneficial. There have always been weaknesses
in the system, but Jaczko brought them to light when he used them to promote his
own interests and agenda. In order for the NRC to return to functioning efficiently
and within its parameters, new legislation is needed to clarify the role of the NRC
Chairman. In response to this need, I have proposed the Nuclear Emergency Re-
Establishment of Obligation Act (NERO).
III. Nuclear Emergency Re-Establishment of Obligation Act
The purpose of the Nuclear Emergency Re-Establishment of Obligation Act is
to clarify the authority of the Chairman of the NRC. The Act is separated into eight
sections.
The first section simply introduces the title of the proposed Act.64 The second
section pertains to the emergency authority of the Chairman. This section would
establish that the Chairman of the NRC must refrain from exercising emergency
authority, which includes making decisions or taking action otherwise reserved for
the full Commission, unless the Chairman has declared an emergency based on an
imminent safety threat to a facility or material licensed or regulated by the
Commission. In addition to the Chairman, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the
Director of National Intelligence, may also determine a security incident exists that
poses an imminent threat to a facility or materials licensed or regulated by the
Commission.65 If the Chairman declares an emergency under his own authority, he
must notify each of the other Commissioners, as well as-appropriate Commission
staff offices within one hour.66 Within four days, the Chairman must notify
Congress of the declaration, including specific reference to the emergency on which
the declaration is basedt and all actions and recommendations made under the
64. See Nuclear Emergency Re-Establishment of Obligations Act of 2011, H.R. 3557, 112th Cong. §l
(2011).
65. See id. §2(a).
66. See id §2(b)(1).
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emergency authority.67 Furthermore, the Chairman shall ensure that all members of
the Commission and all Commission staff involved receive timely and current
access to all records and information relating to actions taken during the
emergency.68 Throughout the emergency, to the extent practicable, the Chairman
shall consult with the full Commission before taking action.69
After the termination of the threat, the Chairman shall declare an end to the
emergency period.70  Within one day, the Chairman shall notify his fellow
Commissioners and Congress that the emergency has passed. 71 No later than ten
days after the termination of the emergency, the Chairman must submit a complete
report to the Commission on the actions taken during the emergency. 72 With the
passage of this proposed legislation, the Nuclear Regulation Commission will need
to amend its procedures in order to comply with the requirements laid out in
Section 2 of NERO. Within 90 days after the enactment of NERO, revisions must
be made defining the roles of the Commissioners during an emergency.7 3 These
changes would specify complete access to records and information relating to
action taken during the emergency, access to Commission staff involved in the
management of the emergency, access to the location or locations where decisions
are made during the emergency and participation in decisions that affect
Commission actions and policies beyond the response to a particular emergency.74
Section 3 of NERO addresses the certification of documents transmitted to
Congress. Any letter or document transmitted by the NRC on behalf of the full
Commission that is sent to a member of Congress in his or her capacity as
Chairman or ranking minority shall include a certification that the transmission is in
accordance with the published procedures of the Commission. This will ensure
that the Commission is acting within the bounds of its authority and with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the full Commission.
Section 4 states that the full Commission must approve all of the NRC
Chairman's appointments of officers, and the officer's continued service shall be
contingent on an affirmative vote by the full Commission at least once every two
years.76
Section 5 of NERO sets time limits for Commission review of briefs requested.
In general, if the NRC issues an order requesting parties to file briefs relating to
whether the Commission should review, uphold, or overturn a decision by the
licensing board, the Commission shall vote on the matter not later than 40 days
after the receipt of such briefs. Additionally, within 10 days after such a vote, the
Commission shall publish its decision,(except in the case of adjudicatory matters),
67. See id.
68. See id. §2(b)(2).
69. See id. §2(b)(3).
70. See id. §2(b)(4).
71. See id §2(b)(5).
72. See id. §2(b)(6).
73. See id. §2(c).
74. See id
75. See id. §3.
76. See id. §4.
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including the votes of each members of the Commission.77 The exception to the
rule would be orders requesting parties to file briefs relating to revocation of a
previously issued license.78
Should the Chairman be subject to allegations of wrongdoing, Section 6 six
requires that the matter be referred to the Inspector General of the Commission.79
Throughout the duration of the Inspector General's investigation, he or she will be
supervised by a member of the Commission other than the Chairman.80  These
modifications to current NRC procedures must be made no later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act. 81
Section 7 addresses the approval of Commissioner travel. With this legislation,
the NRC Chairman shall authorize all domestic and international travel requested
by other members of the Commission for official business unless the Chairman
submits a notice of disapproval that specifies the reasons for disapproving. 82 The
notice of disapproval shall be submitted within five 5 days after the travel is
requested or the travel shall be deemed approved.83
The final section of NERO pertains to budget review and development. With
the passing of this Act, no budget or budget revision shall be adopted for the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission unless each member of the Commission has been
given the opportunity to participate in the development of the said budget or its
revision.84 This includes the Commissioners being provided access to all relevant
information used in such development and making the approval of the budget
subject to a vote by the full Commission.85
The actions of former Chairman Jaczko have demonstrated a need for this
legislation. In order for the NRC to effectively do the job they were meant to, it is
clear that we must clarify and define the roles of the Chairman and the
Commissioners. Each section of my Act is tailored to address a deficiency that
exists in the current rules and procedures that govern the NRC.
Conclusion
I strongly believe that nuclear power is capable of meeting this country's
increasing energy demands and providing electricity in a manner that safeguards the
environment. Nuclear energy alone has the capacity to meet our industrial and
municipal needs while emitting no pollutants or greenhouse gases. By using
thorium, an abundant natural resource, instead of uranium to fuel nuclear reactors
we can create a sustainable energy source with minimal hazardous waste and
77. See id. §5(a).
78. See id. §5(b).
79. See id. §6(a).
80. See id. §6(b).
81. See id. §6(a).
82. See id. §7.
83. See id.
84. See id. §8(1).
85. See id. §8(2).
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virtually no threat of weaponization. The use of small modular reactors in place of
the current larger versions will further decrease the already minute chance of a
nuclear incident. My views address only some of the many decisions that will need
to be made about nuclear energy in the near future. No matter where one stands on
nuclear energy, we can all agree the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has an
extremely important role to play. In order to ensure the best result, we need the
NRC to be functioning at its highest level, not bogged down with competing
political agendas and the power plays of its members. The passage of NERO will
allow the NRC to return to its previous highly efficient state and allow our country
to develop a clean, sustainable energy source.
Since the commencement of this article, President Obama has nominated
Allison McFarlane, a geologist and associate professor of environmental science at
George Mason University, to take the place of Gregory Jaczko as Chairman of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. At her Senate confirmation hearing, McFarlane
pledged, "a strong commitment to collegiality at all levels," saying an agency
empowered to protect public safety, such as the NRC, "requires a respectful
working environment to assure its integrity." In addition, she declared that she is
prepared to "devote all my energies to serving on the NRC with the attributes I
consider important to good governance - openness, efficiency and transparency."
McFarlane was confirmed as Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on
June 29, 2012. It is my sincerest hope that with this new Chairperson and my
legislation the NRC can return to its former status as a premier regulatory agency.
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